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Abstract 
This paper contributes to explaining the rise of logical empiricism in mid-twentieth century 
(North) America and to a better understanding of American philosophy of science before the 
dominance of logical empiricism. We show that, contrary to a number of existing histories, 
philosophy of science was already a distinct subfield of philosophy, one with its own 
approaches and issues, even before logical empiricists arrived in America. It was a form of 
speculative philosophy with a concern for speculative metaphysics, normative issues relating 
to science and society and issues which later were associated with logical empiricist 
philosophy of science, issues such as confirmation, scientific explanation, reductionism and 
laws of nature. Further, philosophy of science was not primarily pragmatist in orientation. We 
also show, with the help of our historical characterization, that a recent account of the 
emergence of analytic philosophy applies to the rise of logical empiricism. It has been argued 
that the emergence of American analytic philosophy is partly explained by analytic 
philosophers’ use of key institutions, including of journals, to marginalize speculative 
philosophy and promote analytic philosophy. We argue that this use of institutions included 
the marginalization of speculative and value-laden philosophy of science and the promotion 
of logical empiricism.  
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1. Introduction 
The 1930s saw the immigration to (North) America of European logical empiricists and, in 
subsequent decades, the quick rise to dominance of their brand of philosophy of science in 
that land (see, e.g., Giere 1996; Stadler 2007). A common history has it that, after the logical 
empiricists’ arrival, part of what they contributed to American philosophy was a theoretical 
framework and set of problems that for the first time delimited the philosophy of science 
from other fields of philosophy and from non-philosophical research into science. Thus, Scott 
Edgar takes 1930s American philosophy of science to have, in general, “offered learned 
commentary on science and its place in society” and not to have been clearly distinguished 
from related fields–psychology, sociology, etc.–studying science (2009, 185). What the 
logical empiricists contributed when they came to dominate philosophy of science in the late 
1940s and 1950s, claims Edgar, was “a conception of philosophy that marked off some 
methods of analysis and inference as distinctly philosophical.” They brought with them a 
shared theoretical background (the techniques of logical analysis) and shared problems (the 
analysis of concepts such as causation, scientific explanation, laws and confirmation) (186). 
Similarly, Fons Dewulf believes that it is in the 1960s that philosophy of science “becomes a 
recognized subdiscipline in philosophy disconnected from the sciences themselves” (2021, 
936). And Friedrich Stadler identifies logical empiricist work in the early 1940s as “the 
beginning of the specific American philosophy of science” (2007, 583). George A. Reisch’s 
(2005) characterization of American philosophy of science before and during the emergence 
of logical empiricism fits these perspectives. Insofar as an alternative to logical empiricist 
philosophy of science is identified in recent literature, it is pragmatist philosophy of science 
(see, e.g., Giere 1996).  
Another focus of recent histories of philosophy of science associates the rise of logical 
empiricism in America with a change in philosophy of science’s normative orientation. It has 
been argued that, from the late 1940s, philosophy of science starts to avoid active 
engagement with social, political and moral concerns (Howard 2003; Reisch 2005; Douglas 
2009). More precisely, the claim is that philosophy of science came increasingly to eschew 
what we have elsewhere (2019) called ‘value-laden approaches to philosophy of science’, i.e., 
approaches that aim to offer empirical descriptions of non-cognitive (social, political, moral) 
values in science or normatively to appraise aspects of the scientific enterprise using non-
cognitive values. 
 We provide a novel portrait of (American) philosophy of science during the period 1900-
1950, before the dominance of logical empiricism, along with a novel understanding of what 
logical empiricism contributed to American philosophy. We also offer a novel explanation 
for the rise of logical empiricism and for the associated withdrawal from value-laden 
philosophy of science.  
Contrary to Edgar, Dewulf, Reisch and Stadler, we show (section 2) that philosophy of 
science already became a recognized sub-field of American, academic philosophy in the early 
decades of the twentieth century, that this sub-field continued to be in place until the middle 
of the century and that its approaches and issues fitted the framework of speculative 
philosophy, with an emphasis on speculative, science-informed metaphysics and on value-
laden philosophy of science. We also show that pragmatism was a minority approach within 
philosophy of science and that the field was already addressing the problems that came to be 
central to logical empiricism and, more broadly, analytic philosophy of science in the 1950s 
and 1960s. 
We then apply (section 3) our recent institutional explanation for the emergence of 
analytic philosophy (Katzav and Vaesen 2017a, 2017b; Katzav 2018) to the case of the rise of 
logical empiricism. We have argued that part of the explanation for the dominance of analytic 
philosophy in the United Kingdom and America is the success of analytic philosophers 
during the period 1925-1969 in taking over key academic institutions, including key journals, 
and using this control to promote analytic philosophy and to marginalize speculative and 
other forms of non-analytic philosophy. Analytic philosophers were able to do this at least 
partly because speculative philosophers’ pluralism about philosophical approach led them to 
give analytic philosophers positions in journals and other academic institutions, positions 
which analytic philosophers subsequently exploited for their own ends. We here argue, in 
light of our observation that pre-1950s philosophy of science was predominantly speculative, 
that the institutional opposition to speculative philosophy also plays a part in explaining the 
rise of logical empiricism. We further observe that, because of the association of speculative 
philosophy of science with value-laden philosophy of science, the account we offer here fits 
neatly with our earlier claim (2019) that logical empiricist opposition to value-laden 
philosophy of science plays a part in explaining philosophy of science’s withdrawal from 
societal concerns. Moreover, we discuss the bearing of our partial explanation for the rise of 
logical empiricism on some other potential explanations found in the literature. 
Finally (section 4), we support the claim that value-laden philosophy of science still had a 
substantial presence in American philosophy in the 1950s and 1960s. This claim is disputed 
by Dewulf (2021) but is to some extent an implication of our argument in section 3, 
specifically of the observation that speculative philosophy was still a force in 1950. Further, 
that value-laden philosophy of science persisted in the 1950s and 1960s makes clear that it 
was sustained pressure exerted by analytic philosophers, including logical empiricists, over 
these decades that marginalized speculative philosophy of science. We also consider whether 
logical empiricist opposition to value-laden research as such was part of the reason for the 
withdrawal of philosophy of science from societal concerns or whether this withdrawal was 
merely a result of the association of value-laden work with speculative philosophy. We argue, 
in line with our earlier work (2019), for the first of these alternatives.1 
Section 5 wraps up our article. 
 
2. American philosophy of science (1900-1950) 
Looking at surveys of American philosophy from 1950, or from immediately prior to 1950, 
we see that philosophy of science is mentioned as a sub-discipline of philosophy in America 
and is covered separately from other fields of philosophy (Brightman 1946; Collins 1950). 
Earlier surveys (Morris 1935) also recognize philosophy of science as a sub-discipline. While 
 
1 There has been substantial discussion of whether logical empiricists, especially the Left 
Vienna Circle (LVC), were politically engaged philosophers of science (See, e.g., Romizi 
2012; Lavine 2020). We, however, are not concerned with figures from within the LVC, but 
only with certain logical empiricists who had positions of influence in the 1950s and in the 
1960s. Moreover, we accept that, in a sense, some of these figures had a political orientation 
that drove their philosophy of science. Our claim will just be that, insofar as they had such an 
orientation, it aimed to achieve political goals indirectly by impacting society though the 
practice of logical analysis rather than by discussing normative issues or empirically 
investigating the non-cognitive aspects of science.  
these surveys note the work of the logical empiricists, and the 1950 one notes the existence of 
American, logical empiricists, logical empiricist work is contrasted with the work of an older, 
American philosophy of science tradition. Thus, for example, the 1950 survey notes that the 
program of the new positivists “was somewhat blunted…by the fact that the other American 
philosophers of science did not share the same faith in positivism and the analysis of 
language” (Collins 1950, 61). The 1935 survey notes that American philosophy of science is 
then becoming more attentive to the work of the Vienna Circle (Morris 1935, 148).  
Further, a number of books from the 1930s and the early 1940s by professional 
philosophers are on philosophy of science and cover the field, either by way of surveying it 
or in order to support a novel position in it (Swabey 1930; Cohen 1931; Northrop 1931; 
Benjamin 1936, 1937; Werkmeister 1940; Ramsperger 1942). These books explicitly 
recognise the emergence of the sub-discipline of philosophy of science (Benjamin 1936, 
Chapter I). Abram Cornelius Benjamin’s 1937 book (1937, Preface) is designed as a textbook 
for the many philosophy of science courses which were being developed in the years before it 
came out. The same is true of Albert G. Ramsperger’s book (1942, Preface). Logical 
empiricism is initially absent from these books but begins to be recognized as one school in 
the philosophy of science as the 1930s progress. 
Finally, there are a substantial number of philosophers working in America who, roughly 
during the period 1910-1950, are academic philosophers of science, that is, they are academic 
philosophers and have the philosophy of science as a primary or sole area of research.2 These 
 
2 It would be a mistake to endorse a narrower definition here, e.g., one that only fits the post-
1950s logical empiricist philosophy of science. Such a definition would merely shift the 
burden of explanation to that of explaining why one group of professional philosophers 
studying science came to dominate the study of science at the expense of another. 
include Benjamin, Edwin A. Burtt, Charles West Churchman, Morris R. Cohen, George 
Conger, Grace A. de Laguna, Theodore de Laguna,  John Dewey, Ray H. Dotterer, Lewis S. 
Feuer, Cornelius L. Golightly, Sidney Hook, Louis O. Kattsoff, Thelma Z. Lavine, Edgar A. 
Singer Jr., David L. Miller, Ernest Nagel, Filmer S. C. Northrop, Stephen C. Pepper, Albert 
G. Ramsperger, Joseph Ratner, Oliver L. Reiser, Roy Wood Sellars, Harold R. Smart, Marie 
T. C. Swabey,  Andrew Ushenko, Philp P. Wiener, William H. Werkmeister, Alfred North 
Whitehead and others (see Table A in the appendix for a selected list of publications of each). 
Thus far, we have indicated that there existed a local, American philosophy of science 
tradition during the period 1910-1950 and that this tradition predates the arrival of the logical 
empiricists in America. Indeed, judging by the numbers of substantial philosophy of science 
publications at around about 1930 (see Table A), the local, American tradition was already 
well developed before the logical empiricists’ arrival. The already mentioned 1935 survey 
agrees with our conclusion here. It traces the American concern with philosophy of science 
back to the decades around the turn of the twentieth century and aims to present the 
established, American philosophy of science tradition as it was in 1935 to an international 
audience (Morris 1935, 142).  
We characterize the field of philosophy of science during the period under consideration 
by noting some key aspects of its largely shared theoretical background as well as some of 
the issues it covered. We first offer a general characterization of the background and of the 
issues and then make the characterization more concrete by discussing the work of a number 
of key philosophers of science from the period. Since one of our goals is to contrast a local, 
American philosophy of science tradition with what the immigrant logical empiricists 
brought with them, we do not include immigrant logical empiricists in our story. 
The theoretical background of American philosophy of science included a distinction 
between critical and speculative components of philosophy of science (in addition to the 
references below, see Benjamin 1937 for a general discussion of the distinction). The critical 
component was taken to include the analysis of science, including of its inferences, claims 
and presuppositions, and used standard philosophical techniques of analysis. Problems 
covered in this part of philosophy of science concerned, among other things, measurement, 
confirmation, scientific explanation, laws of nature, causation, probability, reductionism, 
scientific realism and space and time. The speculative component of philosophy of science 
was (very roughly) taken to include criticizing, and building on, science in order to go 
beyond it and learn more about reality. A key problem in this area was that of how to 
synthesize the results of the special sciences (including physics) in order to develop a 
systematic metaphysics. Figures regularly cited as key to the development of the speculative 
part of philosophy of science are Dewey and Whitehead, among others. The substantive 
claims of speculative philosophers of science, that is, of philosophers of science who 
identified themselves as contributors to the speculative component of philosophy of science, 
were not, however, restricted to those of metaphysics. These claims included empirical, 
evolutionary epistemologies and substantive normative claims that described and addressed 
social, political and ethical issues. Of course, the speculative and critical components were 
interrelated, that is, critical positions were informed by speculative stances and vice versa. 
Importantly, however, not all American philosophers of science during this period were 
sympathetic to speculative philosophy of science; a small minority reject it. Also important, 
speculative philosophy of science was understood to be a species of speculative philosophy. 
While speculative philosophy generally aimed to produce its own, independent substantive 
claims about reality through critical engagement with established opinion (Katzav 2018), 
speculative philosophy of science put particular emphasis on engaging with science in 
developing substantive claims. 
Cohen’s philosophy of science provides a first illustration of the speculative side of early 
American philosophy of science. In responding to pragmatism and new realism at the turn of 
the twentieth century, Cohen defends a conception of philosophy according to which it is a 
form of philosophy of science that aims to develop a vision of reality while learning from, 
and criticizing, the sciences (1910, 1927 and 1931). As he succinctly puts it in his 1931 book 
Reason and Nature: An Essay on the Meaning of Scientific Method (Reason), “[p]hilosophy, 
seeking the most comprehensive vision, cannot ignore the insight gained by the sciences, but 
must go forward to envisage their possible synthesis” (1931, 149). The specific vision of 
reality which Cohen endorses is a form of perspectival realism that centers around what he 
calls ‘the principle of polarity’. This, he writes, “is the principle, not of the identity, but of the 
necessary copresence and mutual dependence of opposite determinations” (1927, 679). The 
idea here is that nature comprises elements exhibiting opposing characteristics, e.g., “unity 
and plurality, rest and motion, substance and function, actual and ideal, etc.” (679). By 
implication, reductivism is opposed, e.g., the mental and the material are taken to be two 
fundamental aspects of the universe (1931, 321-322). Moreover, philosophy must somehow 
resolve the apparent tensions between the pairs of opposing elements revealed by science by 
showing how, though they are real and distinct, they qualify elements in different, compatible 
ways (1927; 1931, 369). Where science does not recognize polarities, philosophy ought to 
drive scientific development by pointing these out (369). The inherent vagueness of scientific 
concepts, and perhaps even of reality, also needs to be recognized where it is unclear which 
of pairs of opposing characteristics are possessed, e.g., when the common-sense distinction 
between hot and cold breaks down (1927).  
Reason also illustrates Cohen’s value-laden philosophy of science and his critical 
philosophy of science. Value-laden work is found, for example, in the book’s examination of 
ethical and political issues in light of developments in the social sciences and in light of the 
principle of polarity. The principle of polarity, and thus speculative vision, is here used to 
illuminate humanity and its place in nature. The principle also informs the book’s critical 
components, which include a general discussion of the logic of science (including of 
measurement, laws of nature, scientific explanation, confirmation, discovery versus 
confirmation and reductionism) as well as treatments of the philosophy of physical science, 
the philosophy of biology, the philosophy of psychology, the philosophy of the social 
sciences and the philosophy of history. 
Nagel, Hook, Feuer, Ratner and Wiener were Cohen’s students (Delaney 2004; Lavine 
1981). Their work also illustrates the speculative and critical aspects of early American 
philosophy of science. We focus here on Nagel, Hook and Ratner. Speculative philosophy of 
science is an important part of the background against which Nagel is working after the 
award of his PhD in 1931; he spends a substantial amount of space criticizing speculative 
philosophy (see, for example, his 1954 book Sovereign Reason and other studies in the 
philosophy of science). As an opponent of speculative philosophy, he takes philosophy to aim 
at examining and reconstructing scientific claims and arguments. That he does so is clear in 
his logical empiricist commitments. In relatively late work, for example, he writes that 
“philosophy can briefly be defined as the analysis of categories” (1957, 41) and that logical 
analysis is “a major if not exclusive task…that the philosophy of science undertakes to 
execute” (1961, 15).3 Nevertheless, Nagel’s work fits well into the field of non-immigrant, 
 
3 Nagel, to be sure, had a metaphysics that superficially resembles Cohen’s, one that 
acknowledges that a “manifest plurality and variety of things, of their qualities and their 
 
American philosophy of science. Like his teacher Cohen, Nagel identifies philosophy with 
philosophy of science (Nagel 1954, 298; Schliesser 2022). Moreover, the issues and positions 
Nagel focuses on throughout his career were the critical issues we have already noted were 
found in Cohen’s 1931 book and, as we will now see, in the work of other speculative 
philosophers of science.4 
Hook and Ratner were speculative philosophers of science. In Hook’s 1927 book The 
metaphysics of pragmatism, which is dedicated to, among others, Cohen, we are told that 
philosophy is primarily vision rather than careful argument (1927, Acknowledgements) and 
that the book aims to develop a metaphysical system that “squares up with the world of 
scientific and social practice” (15). On the critical side, Hook’s book is concerned with laws 
of nature, scientific inference and scientific explanation. Ratner too (1937) aims at a 
speculative metaphysics, one the generalizations of which start from science but go beyond it 
to envisage that all aspects of reality evolve and have an historical nature. And, on the critical 
 
functions, are an irreducible feature of the cosmos” (1956, 7). But Nagel’s position 
supposedly “articulates features of the world which, because they have become so obvious, 
are rarely mentioned in discussions of special subject matter” and which are “meagre in 
content” (6-7). While Cohen aims, as a metaphysician, to go beyond science, Nagel rejects 
the speculative stance and insists instead that he is just articulating what we already know. 
4 We agree with Schliesser (2022) that Nagel also thinks that the philosophy of science aims 
to promote liberal values. As we read Nagel, his view is that the philosopher of science’s use 
of logical analysis itself promotes liberal values, but the philosopher of science does not 
directly engage with such values. Nagel does not espouse practicing value-laden philosophy 
of science. 
side, Ratner deals with issues such as the nature of scientific inference and of scientific 
explanation (see, e.g., his 1935). 
A further illustration of the speculative and critical sides of philosophy of science from 
the period under consideration is found in the work of the de Lagunas, Smart and Swabey. 
Grace de Laguna’s vision of reality, like Cohen’s, is a form of perspectival realism. She 
posits individuals that cannot be fully characterized in conceptual terms and, by implication, 
the behavior of which cannot be fully explained by science. The different special sciences 
nevertheless reveal different, irreducible aspects of individuals’ natures. Initially, the 
individuals that existed were relatively simple and had only physical aspects. However, 
additional aspects, including biological, psychological and sociological aspects emerge in an 
evolutionary process (1899, 1917a, 1917b; Katzav, forthcoming-a). She also develops 
detailed empirical hypotheses about how simple forms of representation found in animals 
evolve into the more sophisticated forms of cognition found in humans (1927; Katzav, 
forthcoming-a). Moreover, with her husband, Theodore de Laguna, she tells a story about 
how our non-scientific concepts evolve into scientific ones and about the evolution of 
different forms of scientific concepts. In this context, they argue that scientific theories are no 
more than true enough for the purposes to which they are put, in line with Grace’s view that 
the special sciences only uncover perspectives on individuals (1910; Katzav, forthcoming-b). 
Theodore (1926) broadens the story of the evolution of science into an account of social 
change, one that synthesizes results from relevant empirical disciplines.5  
 
5 We note that Theodore’s 1926 discussion of whether there are innate, race-related 
differences in intelligence (1926, 99-133) uses problematic language that reflects the 
prejudices of the time, though his aim appears to be to reject the case for such differences. 
 
In developing the speculative side of their philosophy of science, the de Lagunas make 
substantial contributions to critical philosophy of science. In 1910, they offer a critique of 
pragmatist philosophy of science, a critique of the analytic-synthetic distinction, a critique of 
(what came to be called) Quinean confirmation holism, a moderate form of epistemic holism 
and a methodology of research programs (1910; Katzav, forthcoming-b). In the 1910s, Grace 
de Laguna develops a multiple-realizability based critique of scientific reductionism (1917a, 
1917b; Katzav, forthcoming-a). She also, in the same decade, offers an explication of the 
concepts of psychology, one that involves a private language argument and criticism of the 
idea that psychological science might concern itself with essentially private mental states 
(Katzav, forthcoming-a). Theodore critiques the idea of induction and proposes an explicitly 
falsificationist variant of the methodology of research programs (1926, 1930). Both the de 
Lagunas take value-laden philosophy of science to be integral to the philosophy of science. 
They, for example, take it to be part of their job to develop a science-informed account of the 
development of modes of valuation among humans (see, e.g., their 1910 and her 1927). 
Swabey’s (1930) philosophy of science includes, on the speculative side, the view that the 
universe is a unified whole with an essence. Further, the universe’s essence necessitates that 
the universe’s constituents conform to logic and mathematics, and are atomistic and law 
governed. She aims to justify her view on synthetic, a priori grounds and, more broadly, takes 
the existence of synthetic a priori knowledge to be required for the possibility of scientific 
knowledge. Her critical philosophy includes a critique of naturalistic epistemologies of 
science (including those of pragmatism and those in the spirit of that of the de Lagunas), 
theories of inference, measurement, confirmation and probability, a defense of scientific 
 
The de Lagunas’ 1910 book includes (1910, 160) a potentially racist claim, though it does not 
explicitly identify a particular race or seem to express racial superiority or animosity. 
realism, a defense of explanatory reductionism and a vindication of induction. Smart (1931) 
too is explicitly committed to a speculative philosophy of science, one that is particularly 
Hegelian in orientation. He aims to reinterpret the special sciences’ understanding of the 
external world so as to reveal their limitations, illuminate the evolving nature of scientific 
judgement and, ultimately, develop a metaphysics that shows how scientific judgments and 
their objects depend on each other and are part of a single system of experience (1-33, 217-
225; 1934). The critical component of his philosophy of science includes (1931) an anti-
pragmatist, systematic analysis of the fundamental principles of mathematics, physics, 
biology, psychology and the social sciences, alongside a distinction between science and 
pseudoscience, a general theory of scientific inference, a conception of laws of nature, an 
extended argument for thinking that science is explanatory and an account of scientific 
explanation. 
Our estimate is that (at least) a substantial majority of philosophers of science during the 
period under consideration, including almost all of those in Table A, were speculative 
philosophers of science. Further, we estimate that most of the speculative philosophers of 
science, including twenty two of the twenty-nine listed in Table A (see Table A), did not 
identify as pragmatists. We have just described a few of the speculative critics of pragmatism. 
Nevertheless, Deweyan pragmatism, with its insistence that philosophy make substantive 
empirical and normative claims, was part of the speculative tradition (Katzav 2018, 1198) 
and also contributed substantially to the stream of early American philosophy of science. 
Some of the figures we have already discussed, namely Hook and Ratner, combined work on 
science-informed metaphysics of the speculative variety with a strong Deweyan bent (see, 
e.g., Hook 1927 and Ratner 1939). Others working in the Deweyan tradition, including 
Singer Jr. and his student Churchman, developed philosophies of science that aimed to be 
scientific and that were value-laden (see Krikorian 1962 on Singer Jr.’s views and, e.g., 
Churchman 1961 on his own views). Such Deweyan philosophers were still within the 
speculative tradition; while they do not engage in speculative metaphysics, they viewed 
philosophy as aiming to make substantive, empirical claims about reality that go beyond 
those of science. 
We leave further illustration of the connection between speculative and value-laden 
philosophy of science to the next section. The great majority of the philosophers we there 
identify as engaged in value-laden philosophy of science in the 1950s and 1960s were 
speculative philosophers of science. We can nevertheless already see that, contrary to Edgar, 
Dewulf, Reisch and Stadler, academic philosophy included, from the early decades of the 
twentieth century, a conception of philosophy of science that distinguished it from the study 
of science found in the sciences and that included a shared theoretical background and shared 
issues. It is worth adding that pre-1950s philosophy also included models of philosophy of 
science that could, and indeed appear to, have served as paradigms for further work in the 
philosophy of science. We offer two examples. Reason seems to have served, via its 
influence on Nagel and sans its speculative components, as a template for much later work in 
analytic philosophy of science. That Cohen influenced Nagel becomes clear, for example, 
when we see Nagel first adopt, and then criticize, Cohen’s views about logic and 
mathematics. Cohen argues (1918; 1931) for the view that logic and mathematics are 
descriptive of certain invariant relations. This view is straightforwardly reiterated in one of 
Nagel’s first papers (1929) and in Cohen and Nagel’s joint, 1934 book An introduction to 
logic and scientific method, indicating that Nagel initially adopts his teacher’s views. In 
Logic without metaphysics (1954), however, Nagel develops a position that is a response to 
the kinds of position put forward by Cohen. More importantly, Reason reads like a template 
for Nagel’s 1961 book The structure of science: problems in the logic of scientific 
explanation (Structure), which became a paradigm within analytic philosophy of science. The 
critical topics focused on in Reason, along with the order in which they are discussed, are 
mirrored in Structure. And while Reason is broader in focus than Structure, much of Reason, 
like almost the entirety of Structure, is concerned with scientific explanation, laws of nature 
and reduction. Even Nagel’s deductive-nomological account of scientific explanation is 
closely related to Cohen’s view of scientific explanation. Cohen’s view (see, e.g., 1931, 102-
103) is that explanation in science is deduction from a (certain kind) of system of laws.6,7 
Whitehead’s work in the philosophy of science is our second instance of an exemplar. His 
work served, in multiple ways, as a starting point for subsequent work on the synthetic side of 
speculative philosophy of science. Thus, for example, many speculative philosophers of 
science took his work on relativity theory as an important starting point for doing 
metaphysics in a speculative way (see, among others, Northrop 1925, Ushenko 1937, Milič 
Čapek 1961 and Errol E. Harris 1965). That the project of synthesizing the ontologies of the 
special sciences could provide avenues for further research is hardly surprising, given the 
evolving nature of science. 
It is important, before moving to the next section, to explain our claim that the 
philosophers of science under consideration were professional philosophers. Creighton, along 
with Jacob G. Schurman, developed the Sage School of Philosophy after its founding in 
 
6 Sander Verhaegh (forthcoming) recognizes Cohen’s substantial influence on Nagel but 
limits it to an influence on Nagel’s early philosophy of mathematics and Nagel’s naturalism. 
7 Dewulf (2018) takes the first discussion of the deductive-nomological model to be found in 
the 1942 work of the logical empiricist Carl G. Hempel and, indeed, supposes that American 
philosophy of science’s discussion of scientific explanation starts with Hempel. As we have 
seen, Cohen was not the only speculative philosopher of science to discuss scientific 
explanation before 1940. 
1891. The School, run by Creighton, came to provide the model for training philosophers 
across the United States of America (USA). The School included, from 1892, a philosophy 
journal, as well as an undergraduate program, a graduate program, a curriculum, colloquia 
and ties with key philosophers in Great Britain and the USA (Auxier 2005, 550). The journal 
in question, The Philosophical Review (PR), was edited by Creighton (co-editor under 
Schurman from 1896 and chief editor during 1902-1923) and was run from the outset as a 
professional journal, one for experts (Schurman 1892; Creighton 1902). It was the first such 
journal in the USA, joined by JoP in 1904. Creighton was also one of the founders of the 
American Philosophical Association in 1901. Through his editorship of PR, Creighton 
reduced the role of non-academic philosophy in America and played the role of key 
gatekeeper and setter of standards for American philosophy (Auxier 2005, 551). It is thus in 
the early decades of the twentieth century that academic, American philosophers came to be 
educated in standard ways, to publish in a small number of journals dedicated to professional 
philosophy and to participate in an active professional body. The academic philosophers of 
science would, as academic philosophers, be part of this wave of professionalization in 
philosophy. That this is so is borne out by the centrality of publications in PR and JoP to 
philosophy of science in the first half of the twentieth century (Table A illustrates this 
centrality). 
An admittedly more tentative hypothesis about the professionalization of philosophy of 
science is that it was no accident that the early twentieth-century professionalization of 
philosophy in America coincided with the creation of the sub-field of philosophy of science. 
For Creighton, philosophy should be philosophy of science. Philosophy should aim, through 
piecemeal, collaborative investigation, to (a) interpret the methods and concepts of the special 
sciences, (b) criticize, i.e., exhibit the partial truth of, their presuppositions and (c) use the 
results of this criticism to develop a systematic vision of reality (Creighton 1912; Katzav, 
forthcoming-b). This vision of the philosophy of science makes metaphysics, conceived of as 
the systematic account of all experience, a part of the philosophy of science. So too, 
normative issues are taken to be part of the philosophy of science, partly because the criticism 
of science should be criticism that aims to present a humanized understanding of humans and 
their place in nature (Creighton 1902, 1912). Creighton’s way of conceptualizing philosophy 
of science, accordingly, resembles that found later in American philosophy of science in key 
ways, including in its distinction between critical and speculative aspects of philosophy of 
science. Finally, Creighton’s conception of philosophy was designed (Auxier 2005; 
Creighton 1902, 1912) to give philosophy autonomy from religion and from the sciences–
especially from psychology, which was then just going its own way–and thus to help secure a 
place for philosophy in academia. Thus, Creighton’s influential drive to professionalize 
American philosophy in about 1900 also pushes for identifying philosophy with philosophy 
of science and presents philosophy of science in a way that resembles how it comes to be 
conceived of later. By implication, the professionalization of American philosophy may, at 
least through Creighton’s influence, have brought with it the professionalization of the 
philosophy of science. Further support for this conclusion is provided by the observation that, 
among the philosophers of science writing in the immediately following decades, we find 
Creighton’s students, including, notably, Smart (Annelis 2005), Swabey (Tilly 2005) and the 
de Lagunas (Katzav, forthcoming-b). Moreover, Cohen (1910) explicitly identifies the 
creation of PR with a period in which philosophy comes to be thought of as philosophy of 
science, argues for the importance of continuing such an identification and, as we have seen, 
had a role in educating a cohort of philosophers of science. 
 
3. The marginalization of speculative philosophy of science in the 1950s and 1960s 
We have seen that there was a tradition of speculative philosophy of science in America 
during the first half of the twentieth century, one that involved value-laden philosophy of 
science, that was already well developed before logical empiricists started arriving in 
America and that continued to exist at least until the 1950s. This means that the institutional 
pressure which we have elsewhere shown analytic philosophers put on American speculative 
philosophy and have shown was at least partially responsible for the decline of such 
philosophy from the late 1940s (Katzav and Vaesen 2017a, 2017b; Katzav 2018) is likely to 
have resulted in a decline in speculative philosophy of science during this period, along with 
a decline in associated value-laden philosophy of science. The pressure will also have 
impacted that species of speculative philosophy of science that was Deweyan. This overall 
decline in speculative philosophy of science is to be expected because philosophy of science 
was part of the wider community of American, professional philosophers. Speculative 
philosophers of science were trained at the same institutions, published in the same journals 
and participated in the same key conferences as the broader philosophy community. 
Conversely, the drive to promote analytic philosophy would have provided support for 
logical empiricism and, more broadly, for analytic philosophy of science.8 
 
8 While American logical empiricism is widely recognized as being part of analytic 
philosophy, not all those associated with logical empiricism fit comfortably into the analytic 
mold and benefited from the rise of analytic philosophy. This is illustrated by the case of 
Charles W. Morris, whose attempt to combine logical empiricist and pragmatist perspectives 
helped to bring about his marginalization (see Reisch 2005, 342 for a discussion of Morris’s 
fate). 
Thus, leading journals in the United Kingdom and America make a series of abrupt 
decisions to cease publishing speculative philosophy despite ongoing speculative work and, 
instead, more or less solely to publish analytic work. Mind and Analysis in the United 
Kingdom were the first journals to do so, with Mind doing so in about 1925 (Vaesen and 
Katzav 2017b) and Analysis when it was founded in 1933 (Katzav 2018). The main 
destinations for American philosophy of science–which, as Table A illustrates, were The 
Philosophical Review (PR), The Journal of Philosophy (JoP) and PoS–all follow suit by 
1959. PR and JoP do so in about 1948 and 1958 respectively (Katzav and Vaesen 2017a; 
Katzav 2018). PoS does so in 1959, when Richard Rudner becomes its editor (Howard 
2003).9 Other avenues for publishing non-analytic, American philosophy of science were 
extremely limited by 1959. The Monist had been a significant destination for speculative 
philosophy of science during the period 1919-1936, under the editorship of Mary Hegeler 
Carus (see Table A for some examples), but ceased operation in 1936.10 Two new journals 
which might have provided refuge for non-analytic, American philosophy of science were 
The Philosophical Quarterly and Philosophical Studies. But the former, which was founded 
in 1950, ceased to publish non-analytic work before 1959 and the latter, which was founded 
in 1950 by the logical empiricist Herbert Feigl and by the analytic philosopher Wilfred 
Sellars, was dedicated solely to analytic philosophy from the outset (Katzav 2018). 
 
9 Rudner was committed to the view that philosophy of science is solely focused on the 
logical analysis of justification and thus rejected the acceptability of value-laden philosophy 
of science (Vaesen and Katzav 2019). 
10 Prior to 1919, The Monist was under the editorship of Paul Carus and then focused almost 
entirely on publishing work by scientists and Europe-based philosophers. As a result, it was 
not at the time an important destination for American, professional philosophy. 
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research and The Review of Metaphysics were the only 
generalist journals in America which might have been open to non-analytic philosophy of 
science and they were shared by analytic and non-analytic work (see Table 1 in Katzav 
2018). Further pressure on non-analytic philosophy and support for analytic philosophy came 
from the fact that key PhD awarding philosophy departments came to be controlled by 
analytic philosophers during the late 1940s and the 1950s. Such departments include, among 
others, the Sage School of Philosophy at Cornell University and the philosophy departments 
at UCLA and Harvard (Katzav 2018, 1211). 
Our story here is also supported by our (2019) argument that the decline of value-laden 
philosophy of science was, at least in part, brought about by the marginalization of value-
laden work in the philosophy of science by logical empiricists. By the late 1950s, logical 
empiricists had important positions as advisors in the National Science Foundation’s (NSF) 
History and Philosophy of Science (HPS) funding division. These advisors funded almost no 
value-laden philosophy of science in the late 1950s and early 1960s. The result was that 
logical empiricism was supported, since it did not at the time engage in value-laden work, 
while those philosophers of science who were engaged in value-laden work were at a 
disadvantage. Given the association of value-laden philosophy of science with speculative 
philosophy of science, American logical empiricism’s analytic orientation as well as its 
general opposition to philosophy that aims to make claims about reality that go beyond those 
of science,11 the actions of NSF logical empiricists are to be expected. Indeed, two of the 
 
11 The literature does not, as far as we know, contest the claim that American logical 
empiricism opposed this speculative goal. Nevertheless, the next section supports the claim 
that the NSF logical empiricists identified philosophy with logical analysis and thus opposed 
speculative philosophy. 
logical empiricists who acted as NSF advisors at the time, Max Black and Sidney 
Morgenbesser, were involved in marginalizing speculative philosophy elsewhere. Black 
participated in marginalizing non-analytic philosophy at PR (Katzav and Vasen 2017a) while 
Sidney Morgenbesser did the same at JoP (Katzav 2018). 
The dominance of analytic philosophy of science from the 1960s and beyond is thus 
plausibly explained, at least in part, by the control by analytic philosophers of key academic 
institutions. Our observation that NSF funding was used to marginalize value-laden 
philosophy of science also does so. Note, however, that perusal of the contents of prominent 
journals and anthologies during this period is likely to some extent to mask how much 
speculative and value-laden philosophy of science was being done in America. The decisions 
to stop publishing speculative philosophy of science were far too abrupt to coincide with the 
cessation of such work; indeed, section 4 shows that such work was still being done in the 
1950s and 1960s. 
Ronald N. Giere suggests two other candidate, partial explanations for the dominance of 
logical empiricism, namely that by the 1950s pragmatism had ceased to be a fruitful research 
program in the philosophy of science as well as that, for some reason, pragmatists had failed 
to recruit and place sufficient philosophers (1996, 348-349). The force of these potential 
explanations is substantially blunted by our estimate that pragmatists were a minority among 
speculative philosophers of science. Further, we have seen that the issues that came to 
dominate analytic philosophy of science were already an integral part of pre-logical 
empiricist philosophy of science and that, in addition, the speculative component of this 
philosophy of science seems to have provided ample room for further research. It is thus not 
straightforward to see what advantage logical empiricist research programs might have had. 
That pragmatists were not recruiting and placing sufficiently many philosophers is, 
nevertheless, what one should expect if our institutional marginalization story is correct. 
A second potential explanation for the rise of logical empiricism is that logical 
empiricism disengaged from societal and political concerns by the 1950s and thus, unlike 
pragmatism, was well placed to thrive when conservatives were putting political pressure on 
the left during the McCarthy era (McCumber 2001; Reisch 2005). We accept that this too 
may have been a factor in the decline of speculative philosophy of science, especially given 
that speculative philosophy of science was intimately tied to value-laden projects. In line with 
our earlier work (2019, 74), however, we note that these pressures were not decisive. This is 
seen in that JoP was publishing substantial quantities of speculative, including pragmatist, 
philosophy until the end of the 1950s (Katzav 2018; Vaesen and Katzav 2019) and that value-
laden philosophy of science continued to be done in the 1950s and 1960s.  
It has, third, been argued that a key aspect of the professionalization of philosophy of 
science was a factor in explaining the decline of value-laden philosophy of science. Recall 
that Edgar and Dewulf claim that philosophy of science only became a sub-field with its own 
theoretical framework–the logical empiricist one–in the second half of the twentieth century. 
They take this adoption to be a stage in the professionalization of philosophy of science. 
According to Edgar, further, the adoption provided the standards for determining who 
belonged to the field and, because of its identification of philosophy of science with the 
logical analysis of science, was inherently opposed to value-laden philosophy of science. 
Thus, a stage in the professionalization of philosophy of science is supposed to explain the 
exclusion of value-laden philosophy of science from the discipline (2009, 185-187). While 
Dewulf does not think that logical empiricists had in-principle objections to value-laden 
philosophy of science, he does think that there happened to be few of them who were 
interested in value-laden work in the late 1950s and in the 1960s, when they were using their 
theoretical framework to create the field. Professional philosophers of science were simply 
not engaged in value-laden philosophy of science in the 1950s (2021, 941, 947-949). Howard 
(2003, 71-73) and Giere (1996) make similar suggestions to these, though they do so in a 
more tentative way. 
We have, however, seen that academic philosophy of science had already been 
distinguished from the special sciences which were studying science, as well as from the 
other sub-disciplines in philosophy, during the early decades of the twentieth century. The 
distinction was made with the help of the speculative theoretical background and the issues 
associated with this background as well as, at least when it comes to the science-philosophy 
nexus, by the development of the institutions of academic philosophy. Thus, it cannot be the 
aspects of professionalization pointed to by Edgar and Dewulf, namely the acquisition of a 
shared theoretical background and set of issues, that explain the withdrawal of philosophy of 
science from social concerns. Similarly, these aspects cannot help to explain the withdrawal 
from speculative concerns. Other aspects of professionalization, such as the shifting of PoS’s 
focus solely to work by philosophers (Dewulf 2021) and the creation of institutes for the 
philosophy of science (Stadler 2007), did go along with the growing dominance of logical 
empiricist and analytic philosophy of science. This fits with our proposal that success at 
gaining control of key institutions by analytic philosophers is what drove the changes within 
the philosophy of science. 
Finally, it has been suggested (e.g., Soames 2008 and Misak 2013) that the affinities 
between philosophy in America and the work that was being done by the immigrant logical 
empiricists, for example, a widely shared empiricist orientation, helps to explain the success 
of logical empiricism and of analytic philosophy. Further, on this suggestion, there was no 
fundamental disagreement between the logical empiricists and American philosophy. Our 
story agrees that American and immigrant, logical empiricist philosophy of science were 
concerned with many common issues. Indeed, to some extent at least, logical empiricist and 
subsequent analytic philosophy of science took on board issues initially worked on by 
speculative philosophers. At the same time, our story makes clear that there was a 
fundamental divide between early American philosophy of science and what the logical 
empiricist immigrants brought with them. 
 
4. Philosophy of science in the 1950s and logical empiricist opposition to value-laden 
philosophy of science 
In responding to our argument (2019) that value-laden philosophy of science was 
marginalized by logical empiricists at the NSF in the late 1950s and early 1960s, Dewulf 
claims (2021, 941) that, by the 1950s, there was no community of philosophers of science 
who were engaged in value-laden work and thus were potential targets for marginalization 
because of such engagement. This claim is in tension with the story we have told above. On 
that story, there should still be philosophers engaged in value-laden philosophy of science in 
the 1950s. Indeed, our view is that the process of marginalization of speculative philosophy 
of science was an extended one that continued into the 1960s. We, accordingly, rebut 
Dewulf’s claim here and support our argument from 2019. 
Dewulf supports his claim about the absence of value-laden philosophers of science by 
examining our 2019 list of philosophers who were producing value-laden philosophy of 
science in the 1950s and 1960s. He argues that, on inspection, it turns out that only four of 
the eighteen listed were philosophers of science and that, of these, only one, Miller, was 
marginalized; but there is no evidence that he was engaged in value-laden philosophy of 
science, according to Dewulf (2021, 940-941). Our 2019 list, however, is not a list of 
philosophers of science. Rather, the list (2019, 77) is a list of philosophers who did at least 
some value-laden philosophy of science and could have, but did not, receive NSF funding. 
Such a list makes sense since some of those who received funding, e.g., Abraham Edel and 
Gregory Vlastos (Table 1 in Vaesen and Katzav 2019) were not philosophers of science and 
since value-laden philosophy of science was sometimes done by those interested in an 
empirical investigation of norms or in a scientific ethics but were not philosophers of science. 
Edel was one such philosopher. The other philosophers we listed who are similar to Edel in 
terms of their interests but do not receive funding are Sidney Axinn, Jack Kaminsky, Gail 
Kennedy, Paul W. Kurtz, Charles Morris, Dale Riepe, Ralph G. Ross and Ralph W. Sleeper. 
Moreover, there were many philosophers of science who were producing value-laden 
philosophy of science in the 1950s and 1960s. As an indication of this, consider Table B in 
the appendix. Table B includes a list of sixteen books (highlighted in blue) which were 
published during the period 1953-1967 and which include value-laden philosophy of science. 
Some of the books’ authors already appear in Table A and all of them share, with the others 
from table A, having the philosophy of science as a primary, or as a sole, area of research. All 
things being equal, each of these books represents a project that might have benefited from 
NSF funding.  
Table B complements our earlier 2019 list with ten authors: Churchman, Conger, 
Feibleman, Kattsoff, Kuhn12, Lowe, Northrop, Pepper, Reiser and Werkmeister. The table 
also includes six authors who are on Vaesen and Katzav’s list but who Dewulf does not 
discuss, mistakenly does not classify as philosophers of science or mistakenly dismisses as 
 
12 As we noted in our 2019, Kuhn became an NSF advisor in 1970. 
irrelevant despite recognizing that they were philosophers of science: Benjamin, Handy, 
Harris13, Feuer, Hook and Miller. 
The primary focus of Benjamin (not discussed by Dewulf) over many decades was the 
philosophy of science, including speculative philosophy of science, and Benjamin did 
produce a substantive body of value-laden work (see Tables A and B). Handy (not recognized 
by Dewulf as a philosopher of science) is dismissed (2021, 940) as irrelevant on the grounds 
that, other than one paper which he publishes in PoS, namely ‘Personality factors and 
intellectual production’ (1956), his work was on other topics and was not integrated with, or 
even cited by, other work in the philosophy of science at the time. Handy, however, publishes 
four books in the philosophy of science in the decade following the already highlighted book 
from Table B; issues concerning values in science are an ongoing theme of his books (see 
again Table B). Moreover, he publishes a second paper in PoS, namely ‘Philosophy’s neglect 
of the social sciences’ (1958), in which he situates his work in relation to others who were 
doing value-laden philosophy of science, including, from among those listed in Table B, 
Feuer, Kattsoff and Northrop but also others discussed by Vaesen and Katzav (2019), e.g., 
Edel, Kurtz and Paul W. Schmidt, and others not discussed by Vaesen and Katzav, e.g., the 
African American, speculative philosopher of science Golightly (see Table A). Handy’s 
paper, and other work by him, is cited in the literature, e.g., a Google Scholar search brings 
up thirty-two pre-1980 citations of his 1964 book. Handy belonged to the Deweyan side of 
philosophy of science (Handy and Kurtz 1964). Harris (not recognized by Dewulf as a 
 
13 Harris was originally from South-Africa but moved to the U.S. in 1956. He worked there 
until his death (except for the years 1959-1960, when he was affiliated with Edinburgh 
University). Harris was, accordingly, a candidate for NSF funding during the period we were 
concerned with in our earlier study. 
philosopher of science) publishes at least three books in the philosophy of science and had 
value-laden philosophy of science as an ongoing area of research (see Table B). Moreover, 
there is some discussion of his work in the philosophy of science by other philosophers of 
science in the 1960s and 1970s; they recognize Harris as a philosopher of science (see, e.g., 
Brown 1972; Kisiel and Johnson 1974; McMullin 1966). Harris belongs to the tradition of 
speculative philosophy of science that engaged in systematic metaphysics, particularly 
strongly reflects the influence of Hegel, Bergson and Whitehead, and spends decades 
defending this tradition and criticizing analytic philosophy, including logical empiricism (see, 
e.g., his 1954 and 1965).  
There remain the philosophers Dewulf takes to be irrelevant despite recognizing that they 
were philosophers of science. Dewulf states that Feuer was not–because his work did not 
appear in anthologies from the 1960s–representative of philosophy of science in the 1950s, 
that Hook was no longer working in the philosophy of science by the end of the 1950s and 
that Miller was not working in value-laden philosophy of science (2021, 941). But whether 
Feuer’s work was included in anthologies is irrelevant to our concerns in this section; Feuer 
was still a philosopher of science who did value-laden philosophy of science. Miller, in turn, 
does have a standing interest in value-laden philosophy of science, something illustrated by 
the 1959 book on science and human freedom (Table B). And, contrary to Dewulf, Hook 
continues to publish work in the philosophy of science in the late 1950s and early 1960s (see 
his four 1959 papers and his 1963 paper listed in Table B). 
We emphasize that, despite the substantial interest in value-laden philosophy of science in 
the 1950s and 1960s, we are not arguing that such philosophy was strong at the time. There 
was comparatively limited discussion of value-laden philosophy of science. Moreover, 
proponents of value-laden philosophy of science did not set up their own journal once PoS 
ceased to publish such philosophy, become central in running the Philosophy of Science 
Association or set up their own alternative to it. This fits well with the story of the 
marginalization of speculative philosophy of science. Nevertheless, as we argued in 2019, 
value-laden philosophy of science was being produced in the 1950s and 1960s by many 
philosophers and thus was a potential target for marginalization by logical empiricists at the 
NSF. 
Dewulf, in addition to his claim about the dearth of value-laden philosophy of science, 
makes a second claim that should be considered here. According to our 2019 paper, Hans 
Reichenbach provided the philosophical framework within which logical empiricists came to 
work in the 1950s and this framework excluded value-laden philosophy of science from 
philosophy of science (2019, 74). According to Dewulf, however, Reichenbach had no 
objection to value-laden philosophy of science. Moreover, the same is supposed to be true of 
those philosophers of science making decisions about NSF funding, namely Nagel, Black, 
Morgenbesser, Grover Maxwell and Wesley Salmon (2021, 939). If Dewulf is correct, it 
might be thought that the marginalization of value-laden philosophy of science at the NSF 
was not due to any in-principle objection to it but rather because of its association with 
speculative philosophy of science. 
Nevertheless, during the period under consideration, Reichenbach and those operating at 
the NSF explicitly identify philosophy of science with logical analysis and thus would object 
to value-laden philosophy of science’s empirical and normative orientation. Reichenbach 
writes that “[p]hilosophy does not contribute any content to knowledge; it merely studies the 
form of knowledge as exhibited in the work of the scientist and examines all claims to 
validity” (1948, 345). Nagel’s view that philosophy should focus on logical analysis has 
already been noted above. Black describes himself as a conceptual analyst (1985) and, in 
response to the thought that there might be more to philosophy than clarification, writes that 
“it will be time enough to worry about that when clarity is generally valued more highly than 
mystification” (1950, v). Morgenbesser is explicit that the philosophy of science is about 
analysis (Vaesen and Katzav 2019, p.76). Salmon characterizes himself as carrying out the 
legacy of his teacher, Reichenbach (Vaesen and Katzav 2019, p.77). When enumerating core 
and non-core areas of philosophy of science (1999), Salmon nowhere comes near to 
suggesting that value-laden topics are part of it. Maxwell, whose career starts in the late 
1950s, writes, in 1976, that he used to think that philosophical statements “can only be about 
linguistic, conceptual or logical matters” (1976, 332). 
Dewulf does offer, from unpublished sources, statements by Reichenbach and Nagel that 
suggest that philosophy of science should be concerned with the relations between science 
and society. But these statements are not explicit that philosophers themselves may engage in 
empirical or normative work. Thus, Dewulf cites a letter from Reichenbach to the NSF 
director Raymond Seeger in support of the claim that Reichenbach had no objection to value-
laden philosophy (2021, 937). According to Dewulf, Reichenbach’s letter describes what is 
important to the field philosophy of science and implies that “[t]he relations between science 
and society, including applications to education and ethics, belong to philosophy of science” 
(937). Reichenbach writes, regarding a possible NSF philosophy of science division, 
 [t]he work of this division I would outline as follows: 
1) Logical analysis of science. Clarification of scientific concepts; studies in 
scientific methodology; research in mathematical logic and its application to the 
sciences, to linguistics, to engineering problems; training of scientists in logic and 
methodology.  
 
2) Relations between science and society. Studies concerning the impact of science 
on social structure and its influence on human relations. Applications to education 
and social ethics; training of scientists in transferring their methods to the social 
field. (Reichenbach 1925) 
Reichenbach’s statement, however, is about the work of the division rather than that of 
philosophers as such and thus is unclear about what it implies about philosophy as such. The 
statement is, for example, compatible with the view that those funded by the proposed 
division who would engage in empirical, value-laden work and its applications would be 
social scientists rather than philosophers. Indeed, as Dewulf notes, Reichenbach envisages 
philosophers of science as working at institutions that engage in cooperative work with such 
scientists (2021, 937). In light of this, and of Reichenbach’s public statements about what 
philosophy is, it seems plausible that Reichenbach was opposed to value-laden philosophy of 
science. 
Similarly, Dewulf notes that, in the introductions to his philosophy of science courses, 
Ernest Nagel included the relations between science and society within the purview of 
philosophy of science (2021, 939). Nagel, however, does the same in some of his published 
work, but there also, as we have noted, makes clear that philosophers of science will still be 
concerned solely with logical analysis; their interest is in logical relations between ideas in 
science and society (Nagel 1954, 297-298). 
In any case, it is agreed that none of the logical empiricists we have been discussing 
publishes their own value-laden philosophy of science, develops a framework for such 
research or even publicly supports such research in print during the period under 
consideration. Nor, given the opposition to speculative philosophy, would they have accepted 
such work as it was actually carried out by speculative philosophers. Indeed, the funding 
pattern at the NSF indicates a lack of such support. Thus, even if we accept that NSF logical 
empiricists would, in principle, permit work in value-laden philosophy of science, such 
permission would have to be supposed to be for some as yet unarticulated future program in 
the field. This is a long way from a willingness to support the value-laden work that was 
actually being done in the 1950s or 1960s. In sum, it seems that we were, in 2019, correct in 
asserting that although there were many philosophers doing value-laden philosophy of 
science who might have benefited from NSF funding, very few did so and that a plausible 
explanation for this is that it is partly due to an (in-principle or, at least, de facto) opposition 
to value-laden philosophy of science. 
 
5. Conclusion 
We have seen that, contrary to a number of prominent histories, philosophy of science was 
already a sub-discipline of American academic philosophy well before 1950, one that was 
predominantly speculative and had value-laden philosophy of science as an important 
ingredient. This tradition already dealt with the key issues that came to dominate analytic 
philosophy of science before logical empiricism had an impact in America. At least part of 
the reason for the rise of logical empiricist philosophy of science from the late 1940s was the 
marginalization of the earlier tradition of American philosophy of science by logical 
empiricists and by the broader community of analytic philosophers along with the promotion 
of analytic philosophy. This marginalization occurred partly because of the opposition to 
speculative philosophy that was widespread among American analytic philosophers. The 
marginalization also occurred because of the opposition to value-laden philosophy of science 




Table A: American philosophers of science active prior to 1950 and a selected list of 
their publications in the philosophy of science. [B] indicates the publication is a book. 
Journal names are indicated in abbreviated form using the abbreviations from the body of the 
text, with the addition of PPR for Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. ‘pragmatism’ 
indicates school affiliation. 
Abram Cornelius Benjamin 
• Science – existential and non-existential (PR 1927) 
• On the formation of constructs (The Monist 1928) 
• The logical structure of science (1936) [B] 
• Science and the philosophy of science (PoS 1938) 
• An introduction to the philosophy of science (1937) [B] 
Edwin A. Burtt 
• The metaphysical foundations of modern science (1924) [B] 
• Principles and problems of right thinking (1928) [B] 
Charles West Churchman (pragmatism) 
• Elements of logic and formal science (1940) [B] 
• Philosophical aspects of statistical theory (PR 1946) 
• Ethics and science (PoS 1947) 
Morris R. Cohen 
• The subject matter of formal logic (JoP 1918) 
• Mechanism and causality in physics (JoP 1918) 
• Reason and nature: an essay on the meaning of scientific method (1931) [B] 
• An introduction to logic and scientific method (with Ernest Nagel, 1934) [B] 
George P. Conger 
• New views of evolution (1929) [B] 
• A world of epitomizations: a study in the philosophy of the sciences (1931) [B] 
• The horizons of thought (1933) [B] 
• Epitomization: a study in philosophy of the sciences (1949) [B] 
Grace A. de Laguna 
• Dogmatism and evolution (with Theodore de Laguna, 1910) [B] 
• The limits of the physical (1917) 
• Phenomena and their determination (PR 1917) 
• Appearance and orientation (JoP 1934) 
• Cultural relativism and science (PR 1942) 
Theodore A. de Laguna 
• The postulates of deductive logic (JoP 1915) 
• The sociological method of Durkheim (PR 1920) 
• The nature of space – I and II (JoP 1922) 
• The factors of social evolution (1926] [B] 
John Dewey (pragmatism) 
• Experience and nature (1925) [B] 
• Logic: the theory of inquiry (1938) [B] 
• Knowing and Known (with Arthur F. Bentley, 1949) [B] 
Ray H. Dotterer 
• Science as symbol and as description (JoP 1926)  
• Philosophy by way of the sciences (1929) [B] 
• Indeterminisms (PoS 1938) 
• Ignorance and equal probability (PoS 1941) 
Lewis S. Feuer 
• The development of logical empiricism (Science and Society 1941) 
• Metaphysics and social science (Science and Society 1945) 
• Mechanism, physicalism, and the unity of science (PPR 1949) 
• Dialectical materialism and Soviet science (PoS 1949) 
Cornelius L. Golightly 
• Social science and normative ethics (JoP 1947) 
• 8 Case Studies in the Psychopathology of Crime. Vol. III: Cases 10-13 (Ethics 
1949) 
• Inquiry and Whitehead’s schematic method (PPR 1950) 
Sidney Hook (pragmatism) 
• The metaphysics of pragmatism (1927) [B] 
• Reason and nature: the metaphysics of the scientific method (JoP 1932) 
• Dialectic in social and historical inquiry (JoP 1939) 
• Reason, social myths and democracy (1940) [B] 
• The hero in history (1943) [B] 
Louis O. Kattsoff 
• Postulational methods – I, II and III (PoS 1935-6) 
• Observation and interpretation in science (PR 1947) 
• A philosophy of mathematics (1948) [B] 
• The role of hypothesis in scientific investigation (Mind 1949) 
Thelma Z. Lavine (pragmatism) 
• Sociological analysis of cognitive norms (JoP 1942) 
• Naturalism and the sociological analysis of knowledge (1944) 
• Knowledge as interpretation: an historical survey I and II (PPR 1950) 
David L. Miller 
• Emergent evolution and the scientific method (1935) [B] 
• The philosophy of A. N. Whitehead (with George V. Gentry, 1938) [B] 
• Science, technology and value judgments (Ethics 1947) 
Ernest Nagel 
• Nature and convention (JoP 1929) 
• On the logic of measurement (1931) [B] 
• Verifiability, truth and verification (JoP 1934) 
Filmer S. C. Northrop 
• Relativity and the relation of science to philosophy (The Monist 1925) 
• Science and first principles (1931) [B] 
• Causality in field physics in its bearing upon biological causation (PoS 1938) 
• The logic of the sciences and the humanities (1947) [B] 
• Ideological differences and world order: studies in the philosophy and science of 
the world's cultures (1949) [B] 
Stephen C. Pepper 
• The nature of scientific matter (JoP 1917) 
• Misconceptions regarding behaviourism (JoP 1923) 
• Emergence (JoP 1926) 
• The quest for ignorance or the reasonable limits of skepticism (PR 1936) 
• World hypotheses: a study in evidence (1942) [B] 
Albert G. Ramsperger 
• Logic and laws of nature (JoP 1937) 
• What is scientific knowledge? (PoS 1939) 
• Philosophies of science (1942) [B] 
Joseph Ratner (pragmatism) 
• De-moralizing Freud (JoP 1924) 
• Scientific objects and empirical things (JoP 1935) 
• Science as history (JoP 1937) 
• Intelligence in the modern world: John Dewey’s philosophy (work by John Dewey, 
edited with a book-length introduction by Ratner, 1939) [B] 
• Dewey’s contribution to historical theory (1950)  
Oliver L. Reiser 
• The problem of time in science and philosophy (PR 1926) 
• Relativity and reality (The Monist 1931) 
• The promise of scientific humanism: toward a unification of scientific, religious, 
social and economic thought (1940) [B] 
• An institute for scientific humanism (PoS 1945) 
Roy Wood Sellars 
• Evolutionary naturalism (1922) [B] 
• The philosophy of physical realism (1932) [B] 
Edgar A. Singer Jr. (pragmatism) 
• Note on the Physical World-Order. I, II (JoP 1904) 
• On mechanical explanation (PR 1904) 
• Mind as behavior and studies in empirical idealism (1924) [B] 
• Beyond mechanism and vitalism (PoS 1934) 
• Mechanism, vitalism, naturalism (PoS 1946) 
Harold R. Smart 
• The philosophical presuppositions of mathematical logic (1925) [B] 
• Is mathematics a ‘deductive’ science? (PR 1929) 
• The logic of science (1931) [B] 
• An introductory logic (revision of James Edwin Creighton, 1932) [B] 
• Cassirer versus Russell (PoS 1943) 
Marie T. C. Swabey  
• Some modern conceptions of natural law (1920) [B] 
• Substance and Function and Einstein’s Theory of Relativity (trans. with William 
Curtis Swabey from E. Cassirer, 1923) [B] 
• Science and subjectivity (The Monist 1927) 
• Logic and nature (1930 & 1957) [B] 
Andrew Ushenko 
• The logic of events: an introduction to a philosophy of time (1929) [B] 
• Infinity and indefiniteness (The Monist 1930) 
• The theory of logic: an introductory text (1936) [B] 
• The philosophy of relativity (1937) [B] 
• Power and events: an essay on dynamics in philosophy (1946) [B] 
William Werkmeister 
• Seven theses of logical positivism critically examined I, II (PR 1937) 
• A philosophy of science (1940) [B] 
• The basis and structure of knowledge (1948) [B] 
Alfred N. Whitehead 
• Science and the modern world (1925) [(B] 
• Process and reality (1929) [B] 
• Adventures of ideas (1933) [B] 
• Nature and life (1934) [B] 
Philip P. Wiener (pragmatism) 
• Some metaphysical assumptions and problems of neo-positivism (JoP 1935) 
• Philosophical, scientific, and ordinary language (JoP 1948) 
• Evolution and the founders of pragmatism (1949) [B] 
 
Table B: American value-laden philosophy of science (1953 to 1967). Selected 
publications of authors. Key value-laden work is highlighted and characterized in blue.  
Abram Cornelius Benjamin  
• Some theories of the development of science (1953) 
• Is the philosophy of science scientific? (1960) 
• Science, technology and human values (1965) [B]  
A critique of logical empiricist positions as well as an examination of the relations 
between scientific and non-scientific fields, of the cultural aspects of science and of 
the role of values in science 
George P. Conger   
• Synoptic naturalism (1960)  
Sketches a picture of the universe, including of the evolution of society, and draws 
normative conclusions from this, by studying all the sciences, including the social 
sciences (revised version of his 1931 book from table A) 
Charles West Churchman 
• A critique of scientific critiques (1953) 
• Science and decision making (1956) 
• Prediction and optimal decision: philosophical issues of a science of values (1961) 
[B] 
Takes a first step in developing a science of science by investigating the 
methodological problems in determining what humans’ values, including those of 
science, are 
James K. Feibleman  
• Inside the great mirror: a critical examination of Russell, Wittgenstein and their 
followers (1958) [B] 
• The psychology of the scientist (1960) 
• Foundations of empiricism (1962) [B] 
Proposes a systematic, science-informed metaphysics and uses it as a basis for an 
ethics 
• The impact of science on society (1962) 
• The human future from scientific findings (1968) 
Lewis S. Feuer  
• Psychoanalysis and ethics (1955) [B] 
• The principle of simplicity (1957) 
• The scientific intellectual: the psychological & sociological origins of modern 
science (1963) [B] 
Criticizes Merton’s view that the protestant ethic had a decisive positive influence on 
the development of modern science, proposes that a hedonistic-libertarian ethic was 
and uses this proposal to critique American science 
Rollo L. Handy 
• The naturalistic reduction of ethics to science (1956) 
• Methodology of the behavioral sciences: problems and controversies (1964) [B] 
• A current appraisal of the behavioral sciences (with Paul Kurtz, 1964) [B] 
Catalogues developments in the behavioral sciences and, inspired by John Dewey and 
Arthur F. Bentley, suggests a direction that might permit a synthesis. Section 7 
focuses on preferential behavior and supports and provides advice about the scientific 
investigation of values. 
• Value theory and the behavioral sciences (1969) [B] 
• The measurement of values: behavioral science and philosophical approaches (1970) 
[B] 
• Useful procedures of inquiry (with Edward C. Harwood, 1973) [B] 
Errol E. Harris  
• Scientific philosophy (1952) 
• Objectivity and reason (1955) 
• Nature, mind and modern science (1954) [B] 
• The foundations of metaphysics in science (1965) [B] 
Aims to determine the precise character and significance, including the purpose, of 
the scientific age through a systematization of the results of the special sciences 
• Hypothesis and perception: the roots of scientific method (1970) [B] 
Sidney Hook 
• Marx and the Marxists: the ambiguous legacy (1955) [B] 
A critical evaluation of developments in Marxist political theory.14 
• Naturalism and first principles (1956) 
• Necessity, indeterminism and sentimentalism (1958) 
• John Dewey—philosopher of growth (1959) 
• Man and nature: some questions for Mr. Mitin (1959) 
• Science and mythology in psychoanalysis (1959) 
• Science and human wisdom (1959) 
• Objectivity and reconstruction in history (1963) 
Louis O. Kattsoff  
• The design of human behavior (1953) [B] 
An examination of the role of values in the social sciences. 
• Logic and the nature of reality (1956) [B] 
• Physical science and physical reality (1957) [B] 
Thomas S. Kuhn  
• The structure of scientific revolutions (1962) [B] 
An essay in the history and philosophy of normal and revolutionary science, 
including of the role of societal factors in paradigm choice. 
Victor Lowe  
• Whitehead and the modern world: science, metaphysics and civilization (1950) [B] 
• Understanding Whitehead (1962) [B] 
 
14 At least until Rudner took over the editorship of PoS (in 1959) and banned them, 
engagements with Marxist political theory were within the scope of the philosophy of 
science. As Howard (2003) and Vaesen and Katzav (2019) point out, before Rudner’s 
editorship, PoS regularly published articles on Marxist thought. 
An exposition of Whitehead’s system, including of his metaphysics, his philosophy of 
science, his philosophy of value and how these interrelate 
David L. Miller  
• The importance of presents in contemporary science (1957) 
• Sinnott's philosophy of purpose (1958) 
• Recent speculations in the positivistic movement (1959) 
• Modern science and human freedom (1959) [B] 
An evolutionary and social science-based argument for free will, one that considers 
the relationship between freedom and norms and the possibility of a science of norms 
• The function of pasts in science (1965) 
Filmer S. C. Northrop  
• The complexity of legal and ethical experience: studies in the method of normative 
subjects (1959) [B] 
• Philosophical anthropology and practical politics (1960) [B] 
Uses the results of the natural and social sciences to develop a theory of humans and 
nations. Applies this theory to describe and address political problems 
Stephen C. Pepper  
• The sources of value (1958) [B] 
An appeal to results from the various sciences, including the social sciences, in order 
to support a naturalistic, utilitarian theory of values 
• A proposal for a world hypothesis (1963) 
• Concept and quality: a world hypothesis (1967) [B] 
Oliver L. Reiser  
• The evolution of cosmologies (1952) 
• Postulates for an ethics of belief in science, religion and philosophy (1956) 
• The integration of human knowledge (1958) [B] 
• Man’s new image of man (1961) [B] 
Defends a scientific humanism and the need for an associated cosmology 
William H. Werkmeister  
• An empirical approach to value theory (1955)  
• Theories of ethics (1961) [B] 
• Reflections on the possibilities of metaphysics (1964) 
• Man and his values (1967) [B] 
Develops a theory of values and value standards that is informed by empirical, 
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